ZACHARY SNG
The Construction of Lyric Subjectivity in Shelley's "Ozymandias"
The view of life presented by the most refined deductions of the intellectual philosophy, is that of unity. Nothing exists but as it is perceived. The difference is merely nominal between those two classes of thoughts, which are vulgarly distinguished by the names of ideas and external objects. Pursuing the same thread of reasoning, the existence of distinct individual minds, similar to that which is em ployed in now questioning its own nature, is likewise found to be a delusion. The words I, you, they, are not signs of any actual difference subsisting between the assemblage of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed to denote the different modifications of the one mind.
Let it not be supposed that this doctrine conducts to the monstrous presumption that I, the person who now write and think, am that one mind. I am but a portion of it. The words I and you, and they are grammatical devices invented simply for arrangement, and totally devoid of the intense and exclusive sense usually attached to them. It is difficult to find terms adequate to express so subtle a concept as that to which the Intellectual Philosophy has conducted us. We are on that surprising itinerary?a line of reasoning begins with unity as a refined product of "intellectual philosophy," but finds itself eventually at the brink of "the dark abyss of how little we know." From a starting position of unity, we follow the trajectory projected by this "Intellectual Philosophy" and conclude at the sameness of "I, you, they" as merely different modifica i. Percy Bysshe Shelley, "On Life," The Complete Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. Roger
Ingpen and Walter Peck, vol. 6 (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd, 1929 ) 196. SiR, 37 (Summer 1998 ZACHARY SNG tions of one mind. Surprisingly, this revelation?this lifting of the veil of delusion?leads not to lucidity but dizziness, not to knowledge but rather the impossibility of knowledge. The question is: why and how is it, that following Shelley's reasoning moves us from a position of unity to a state in which we experience so terrible a linguistic and cognitive threat that "words abandon us" and "we grow dizzy"? What is the logic governing this vector that begins in unity but ends in silence and darkness?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to interrogate the nature of unity as it is employed by Shelley. It might be premature to assume that when two entities are brought into a relation such that "difference is merely nominal," they stand together in a simple sameness. It is possible to posit a simultaneous co-existence that multiplies rather than reduces complexities and meanings. Heidegger makes the following observation on sameness and difference in one of his H?lderlin essays:
The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifference of what is merely identical. In Shelley's passage, the peculiar oscillating unity that separates while it LYRIC SUBJECTIVITY IN "OZYMANDIAS" 219 brings together holds in proximity not just the pronominal markers of various subject positions (I, you, and they); it is also the relation which binds the writing, thinking "I" to the enunciated I, the grammatical device that marks an articulated subjectivity. tached to them," and are simply grammatical markers, then the position of the one who thinks and writes becomes compromised, and its ability to manifest or even articulate itself with any authoritative immanence through its pronoun becomes suspect. The text itself therefore cannot be grounded in the authorial presence and its availability as a subject position within textuality.
Rather than marking singular, discrete subject positions, the pronouns in Shelley's passage, including the "I," all seem to point to the "one mind"
with its different modifications, of which the writing subject is but a part.
We are reminded, however, in an appositive clause, that the "I" is the person who "now" writes and thinks. This moment in the passage is significant?just prior to the final containment of the individual subject position within a purely spatial configuration of markers that all point to the undifferentiated one mind, a time adverbial is inscribed, pointing to a "now," a moment of writing that is generated by and generative of writing. The one mind, with its inseparable modifications, goes on to rarefy itself beyond the limits of knowledge and language, but this "I"?"the person who now write [s] The time adverbial in Shelley's passage thus introduces a third position to be inhabited by the subject, one whose referentiality is confined to the "instance of discourse" which contains it. It is ironically this fleeting moment that allows the "I" to split off from the self-consuming spatial dialectics of the passage and persist as residual voice. As we have seen, the written "I" and the writing "I" are not identical, but rather held together in a complex relation of unity, separated by a distance that can be pointed across. From the point at which the "I" becomes inscribed, it locates itself in a spatial configuration that now limits and defines it, namely the space of writing, or poetic space. This spatial framework constructs and installs the "I"?the position inscribed as the poetic subject. We shall call this the "lyric I." In reading it, we read not simply how it behaves and the configurations which it installs, but also how it came to be, and the configurations which brought it about. An "I" in discourse has a double function: it is at once a referential pointer to the speaking subject, proper to the paradigmatic rules that provide for language, and also the marker of a grammatical position, existing only within a particular syntagma. This is the doubleness noted by Benveniste in "The discourse," that is, the discrete and always unique acts by which the language is actualized in speech by a speaker. (217) The passage is strikingly similar to Shelley's. What we shall add to Ben veniste's description is the observation that, in all modes of discourse, both these functions of pronouns exert their presence as possibilities, paradig matic poles of linguistics. These two poles, as described by Benveniste, exist only as limits?one stands as the perfectly horizontal axis of syntax as pure combination, and the other the idealized moment of enunciation as actualization, tying speech to speaker. Each instance of a pronoun in ZACHARY SNG language actually participates in both these modes, and is conditioned by both axes of possibility simultaneously.
Lyric subjectivity is thus constituted and held through strategic moments of gravitation towards and movement away from these two possible "I"s. In a poem such as "Ozymandias," the lyric "I" as originary speaker position subtends, generates and participates in the "grammatical arrangement" that Shelley describes. The integrity of its position is dependent on its ability to hold itself apart from the other subject positions, evacuating and rein forcing a space for itself, and also on the critical distance between speaker position and written pronoun, which would enable the latter to persist as Shelley describes the sort of differentiation which the lyric "I" has to perform: to preserve its voice?it has to hold itself apart from all that it sees and feels. In other words, it has to hold itself apart from its perceptions, constructing a receptive surface for itself, dividing inner and outer. In short, it installs itself as subject. In doing so, it differentiates itself from other subjects?the you and the they. The process of differentiation which it enacts in order to do so is more akin to espacement than the tracing of actual margins or borders of ontological difference. The lyric "I" is involved in an intricate economy of space?a space inhabited by other pronouns and subjects, and organized by moments of coming together, falling apart, containment and punctuation.
In "Ozymandias," the hermeneutic imperative mentioned earlier seems to imply that the issues which surround the moment of the apparition of as the addressee position of the lyric, and the traveller is the "It," the something that is spoken about. It is into this articulated structure, already provided for by the rhetorical rules of language, and thus in relation to these two positions, that the lyric "I" makes its entrance.
Martin Buber describes in his work, I and Thou,8 two modes of experi ence and thinking: the I-You relation and the I-It relation. He calls these "primary words" (Grundworte). These are not simply two ways of relating to others; the subjects that are constituted by the two different relations are not at all one and the same. This coincides with the view expressed in Shelley's "On Life"; in both cases, pronouns like "you" or "they" are not treated as objects, which would imply a stable thematizing subject position, but rather as relations which play a constitutive role in the formation of the "I" in relation to another subject. This is the relation which subtends the trope of apostrophe. The "It" is a thing, and is contained and bound by other things, but the "You" is boundless. The "I" of the I-It relation installs itself securely as the active subject, and through the process of thematization, or making a "something," it contains and holds stable that which it faces. The "I" of the I-You relation, however, is in a more precarious position. The "You" is not a thing, and has no ontology prior to the address; in order to engage it, the "I" has to create it, by installing a position which is capable of speech and hearing. This is the key to describing how the lyric "I" manages to hold itself at a distance from Ozymandias as speaker, and explicating the relationship between the success of the former's address and the failure of the latter's.
Ozymandias' address is an example of an inscription as material marker of a voice that belongs to an absent or dead speaker?in other words, an epitaph. This is Frye's account of the genre:
In another lyrical genre the block relates to the reader rather than the poet: this is what we find in the epitaph convention that we have had from the Greek times on. Here the reader is assumed to be a traveler, pursuing his normal course through time and space, who is suddenly confronted with something he should stop and read. What he reads is the verbal essence of a life which has once had its context in time and space but is now enclosed in a framework of words. He is often told, at the end, that he has been looking in a mirror: his own context is still in ordinary space and time, but it will eventually disappear, and the verbal essence of his life may make an equally short poem. (32) (33) This address participates in a genre that involves the seeking and the arresting of an addressee by a voice from a dead or absent speaker. The object of this search is the passing traveller, whose attention is caught by the inscription long enough for him to become the "You" of the apostro phe inscribed there. Ozymandias' epitaph has managed to find an addressee, but what remains missing is the "something" about which the conversation has to be about. The irony of Ozymandias' words lies partly in the fact that its perlocution fails even though it is syntactically well-formed and semantically meaningful. The words themselves conform to the rules of rhetoric and grammar, but the deictic quality of its indexicals necessitates surate with its form becomes a sign of the speaker's hubris. Yet, it is this very same ability of language to be separated from its material context that forms the pre-conditions for the lyric "I"s voice, and thus the entire poem.
"Ozymandias" as a lyric is a written text that persists beyond the unique event of its inscription and address. The structure of language allows for the potentially infinite iterability of its linguistic signs without the presence of their objective correlates, opening it to removal from its context in space and time, and by this very move allowing it to extend its life-span beyond the singular moment of its production. In "Ozymandias," this property simultaneously determines the success of one address and the failure of another. The lyric "I" therefore stands in a necessarily ambiguous relation to Ozymandias, one that oscillates between sameness and difference. Its proximity to Ozymandias' address is inescapable, for the structures of both are provided for by a common property of language; yet, difference has to be held if its own utterance aspires to a life-span longer than that of the king. The set of rules that provide for the possibility of citation is, by its very nature, inseparable from the possibility of its failure. The susceptibility of language to repetition is, in the words of Derrida, "a failure or trap into which language may fall or lose itself as in an abyss situated outside of or in front of itself" (17).
On the thematic level, the nested structure of the lyric ensures that this failure remains firmly installed from the start as an "It" and thus contained, to a certain extent. The scene of Ozymandias' linguistic failure is tied to the direct reference to materiality that it attempts to install. The utterances of the lyric "I" and that of the traveller are consequently situated further from the infelicitous reference that ties Ozymandias' fate to the integrity of material correlates. The traveller's story gestures only to a vague geog raphy, describes only dismembered body parts rendered in stone, and takes as its central theme a failed address. The lyric "I"s tale is one even farther removed from the circumstances of its own production?the phrase "an tique land" removes it from both present time and present place, and the that further destabilizes geographical reference. There is thus a thematic hierarchy at work here: Ozymandias' address is the most directly connected in its reference to materiality, while the lyric "I"s is the least, with the traveller's somewhere in between. At the opposite pole from Ozymandias' inscription as grandiose but vain gesture, we thus have the poem itself as a system of dedicated reference. Its theme is itself linguistic in nature, and this reflexivity allows it to represent the conditions for its own production within the poetic space, mirrored in the two narratives that it encloses.
The successful apostrophe, in "Ozymandias"' terms, is therefore one that turns away from the material circumstances of its own production, pointing the lyric "I" towards an addressee and installing a dialogic structure that forms the ground of the utterance.9
Our reading has thus far addressed the problem of belief in reading the poem, in that it answers, in non-psychologized terms, why we believe the words of the "I" will persist and escape the fate of Ozymandias' hollow We have noted the ways in which the "I-It" relationship makes of its object a thing, and enacts a containment through thematization which 9-It would thus be akin to the successful performative, which does not have its referent, in Derrida's words, "outside of itself, or in any event, before and in front of itself" (13), but rather, completely coincident with its actual enunciation. The poem's terms thus invite us to interrogate the identity of the address of a lyric in terms of its apparition as a rhetorical, rather than psychological subject position. which we encountered in "On Life" and hinted at briefly in our reading of Buber, but which we have yet to consider in "Ozymandias," involves prosopopoeia of the original sort. It conditions the move from the space of the paradigmatic which is inhabited by the "I" that is still the mere potentiality of a word, to the "I" which is inscribed as an actual mark, open to syntagmatic combinations. It is the primary word which forms the condition for the possibility of writing itself, namely the I-'T" relation. The sameness that we posited between these two entities at the beginning now returns to be read.
The "I" which begins the poem stands at the precarious edge of an abyss. It is itself a pronoun, participating in the poetic space and its differences.
At the same time, however, it points the way to the poet who thinks and writes, whose presence is excluded from the poem itself. Shelley claims a position for the "I" who thinks and writes that makes this absence neces sary, namely its participation in the one mind which is conscious of no distinction. The lack of differentiation that guarantees a vivid apprehension of life, thus also guarantees the absence of this subject from the inscription which it produces to represent this apprehension. The written "I" has to be made to speak for this absence, and the trope which allows the absent or the dead to speak is, of course, prosopopoeia. The poetic effect of the lyric is to hold the written "I" and the writing "I" in a relation of sameness, such that the former can stand in a relation of true appearance, in the Heidegerrian sense, to the latter, and herald its presence. This gesture is thus the primary marker of the poetic, for it has to be performed before any of the other structures?the I-You and the I-It relations?can be put into place. The trope of apostrophe seen in this light emerges as an iteration of this original move of giving voice to the written "I" by making it point to the writing "I."
As a gesture of turning away, apostrophe enables not just the move from the "real" to the poetic world, as in Frye's account of the lyric, but also the lyric "I"s turning from its contemplation of its relation to the writing "I," to a spatial confrontation with the lyric "You." As our reading has shown, this is the moment of poetry, in the sense of making or creation, for it is from this moment that the "I" achieves voice, and is able to articulate itself. The lyric "I" in Shelley's poem is an example of a written mark which manages to navigate the border of materiality and conscious ness, without tumbling into the abyss on either side. It manages to maintain its function both as placeholder in the spatial configuration of the lyric, in ZACHARY SNG terms of its relation to its addressees and objects, and also as the herald of the "I" that cannot show itself. Most importantly, it holds these two configurations apart even while it participates in both of them. The lyric "I" thus acts as a border between them, a margin that generates the possibility of writing. Ozymandias' monument, however, performs a move which is something other than this setting-in-sameness; it brings together on one surface and in one form the consciousness of the "I" and its appearance, its material trace. The bodily interiority that represents the integral immanence of the subject is projected onto the same surface as, and made coincident with its exteriority, the manifestation which it pre sents as the border that holds it apart from other subjects. Ozymandias' statue thus usurps and contains the "I" that sees and feels, and literally makes of it a thing. The two modes of existence which the "I" inhabits are collapsed onto this one surface of the statue, and the consequences of this proximity are p?trification, mockery, and physical destruction. This is the inverse death scenario of the earlier "I" which remains in the state of reverie, and in union with the "one mind." Such an "I" would be in complete one-ness with the universe, but remain without body, voice or any other material pointer. In the case of Ozymandias, the death involves a complete reification of this "I" in its material marker, the consequence of which is the fragmentation of this petrified corpse/marker, and the persistence of only its voice?its most material aspect.
In the poem, this opposition of interiority and exteriority is represented by "the hand that mocked" and "the heart that fed" the stone features of immediately collapsed and set in stone. This collapse can also be traced in the rhetorical register. The relationship between exterior features and interior subjectivity is presented as one of feeding; the "wrinkled lip" and "sneer of cold command" on Ozymandias' visage are said to be "fed" by a source, determined by a relationship of nurturing that enables the origin to make its presence manifest in its dependents. This source is figured as the "heart," which represents the original totality of the subject that is made manifest in its external features. We thus have a juxtaposition of a physi ological system and a metaphysical one, with the former being substituted and made to represent the latter in the text, based on the similarity of the two hierarchies. On the other side of the divide, we have the primary instrument of representation ("the hand that mocked them") standing in for the entire body of the perceiver, a subject position that stands in proximity to the body of Ozymandias, and that is able to perceive and represent its features with the utmost fidelity. The hand is thus the substi tute for an entire chain of relations that is grounded on contiguity. In rhetorical terms, therefore, the stone surface of Ozymandias is positioned as the intersection of the metaphoric axis of similarity and the m?tonymie one of contiguity, or rather the nexus into which they are both collapsed.
This moment of collapse is actually a rhetorical double of Ozymandias' inscription, which attempts to enact the same condensation of terms. The inscription names the erect statue, attempting to hold stable a vertical structure of identity, while simultaneously pointing to the "Works" that surround the scene of inscription along the axis of contiguity, arranged together with the statue in a horizontal chain and organized by the principle of proximity. The vertical structure eventually crumbles, proven untenable by the uncontrollable proliferation of the horizontal. horizontal axis of metonymy as combination. It participates in relations of sameness with both the "I" who speaks and writes, and the "I" which stands in the configuration of subjects and relations that make up the textual space of the poem. An originary moment is required to unite these disparate elements, thus permitting the poem to be voiced, but this unifying moment does not recede as a hypostatized origin. The poetry generated by this moment remains grounded in the conditions that allowed for its may seem a strange lyric, for its speaker professes no grand emotions and performs no high affective drama; yet, it addresses the very essence of lyricism in its bold, albeit oblique, approach to the space in which the writing subject is constituted, where poetry itself becomes a possibility.
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